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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE ORDERS OF JUDGE SAWAYA 
VIOLATE THE U. S. CONSTITUTIONS' FIRST; ELGHT AND FOURTEEN 
AMENDMENTS. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT ORDERS OF JUDGE SAWAYA 
WRONGFULLY DENY HIS VISITATION RIGHTS WITH HIS DAUGHTER. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT JUDGE SAWAYA ABUSED THE 
POWERS OF CONTEMPT IN DENYING APPELLANT VISITATION RIGHTS. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT JUDGE SAWAYA WRONGFULLY 
SIGNED ORDER OVER THE TIMELY FILED OBJECTIONS OF APPELLANT 
AND THEN DID NOT ALLOW APPELLANT TO OBJECT TO THE AMENDED 
ORDER. 
3 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING AN ORDER THAT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING VISITATION FOR THE 
SOLE REASON OF NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONDITIONING THE RESTORATION 
OF VISITATION RIGHTS UPON THE PAYMENT AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
SUPPORT ORDERS. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN USING IT'S CONTEMPT POWER TO 
DENY AND TERMINATE VISITATION. 
THE TRAIL COURT ERRED IN DENYING VISITATION BY NOT 
REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO FILE A PETITION TO MODIFY. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING A ORDER OVER THE 
TIMELY FILED OBJECTIONS TO SAID ORDER. 
n 
JURISDICTION 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF JULY 13; 1990 
AND THE FINAL ORDER OF JANUARY 9; 1991; BEFORE JAMES S. 
SAWAYA; JUDGE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; SALT 
LAKE CITY; STATE OF UTAH. 
THIS APPEAL WAS FILED BY NOTICE OF APPEAL ON AUGUST 13; 
1990; TO THE Z 
ABOVE COURT. 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL BY VIRTUE 
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 77-35-26 (2A) AND (B); AND RULE 3 OF 
THE RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS. 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ON FEBRUARY 24, 1990, RESPONDENT FILED A AFFIDAVIT AND 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AGAINST THE APPELLANT* ASKING THE COURT 
TO HOLD THE APPELLANT IN CONTEMPT AND DENY ANY CONTACT WITH 
HIS DAUGHTER TO HIM. 
ON JUNE 18* 1990, JUDGE SAWAYA HEAR RESPONDENT ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE AND FOUND THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT; 
SENTENCED HIM TO 30 IN THE COUNTY JAIL; DENY HIM ALL CONTACT 
WITH HIS DAUGHTER. 
ON AUGUST 13, 1990, APPELLANT FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO THIS COURT. 
ON OCTOBER 10, THIS COURT VACATED THE DENIAL OF 
APPELLANT'S VISITATION RIGHTS. 
ON JANUARY 9, 1991, JUDGE SAWAYA SIGNED A AMENDED ORDER 
AGAIN DENYING APPELLANT ALL CONTACT WITH HIS DAUGHTER. 
6 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
THE PETITIONER FILED FOR DIVORCE ON THE 31ST DAY OF 
DECEMBER, 1981, (DISTRICT COURT INDEX #2,, HEREAFTER 
REFERRED TO AS DCI). ON THE 26TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1982 THE 
DIVORCE WAS GRANTED TO BECOME' EFFECTIVE • AFTER THE 3"MONTH 
INTERLOCUTORY PERIOD (DCI# 12-14). PETITIONER AGREED BY 
STIPULATION TO PAY TO RESPONDENT,* THE' SUM OF $250.00 PER 
MONTH A^ CHILD' 'SUPPORT,1 A SUM THAT WAS 'EQUAL "TO 75% 
OF PETITIONER GROSS INCOME (DCI#7"10H 
ON THE SEPTEMBER 29, 1982 PETITIONER FILED FOR 
PROTECTION UNDER CHAPTER 7 OF THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT. 
ON THE OCTOBER 12, 1982, RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE, (DCI# 20). IN SAID ORDER RESPONDENT ASKED THE 
COURT TO HOLD THE PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT. THIS WAS DONE 
BEFORE THE DIVORCE BECAME FINAL AND WHILE THE PETITIONER WAS 
UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT. 
AFTER THE PETITIONER'S BANKRUPTCY WAS DISCHARGED HE 
PAID THE RESPONDENT ALL PAST DUE CHILD SUPPORT. 
ON THE SEPTEMBER 27, 1982, RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER' TO 
SHOW ' CAUSE (DCI# 400, ASKING THE COURT AGAIN TO FIND 
RESPONDENT IN' CONTEMPT. THE CONTEMPT INVOLVED THE PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AND WAS PREVIOUSLY DISCHARGED IN THE BANKRUPTCY. 
SAID O.S.C. WAS STRICKEN ON THE 8TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1983 
(DCI# 47). PETITIONER AGREED TO PAY THE PAST DEBT AND A 
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ORDER CONFORMING TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES WAS SIGNED 
BY THE COURT ON THE 7TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 1984 (DCI# 53-55). 
ON THE APRIL 20. 1984 PETITIONER FILED A MOTION TO 
AMEND THE DIVORCE DECREE TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO EXPAND 
HIS VISITATION BECAUSE RESPONDENT UNREASONABLY WAS DENYING 
HIM REASONABLE VISITATION (DCI# 6 0 ) . SAID MOTION WAS 
STIPULATED TO AND THE ORDER GRANTING SAID REQUEST WAS SIGNED 
ON THE 21ST OF JUNE 1984 (DCI# 65-67) 
ON AUGUST 6, 1985 PETITIONER FILED A ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE BECAUSE RESPONDENT WAS DENYING HIM VISITATION WITH HIS 
DAUGHTER (DCI# 6 8 ) . RESPONDENT AGREED TO ALLOW VISITATION TO 
RESUME AND THE O.S.C. WAS STRICKEN. 
ON MARCH 27, 1986, RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE AND PETITION FOR MODIFICATION (DCI# 71 & 74-83). IN 
THESE MOTIONS AND ORDERS RESPONDENT WANTED THE COURT TO HOLD 
THE PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT AND TO DENY HIS VISITATION WITH 
HIS DAUGHTER, UNTIL HE PAID THE PAST DUE CHILD SUPPORT 
PAYMENTS, AND THEN TO RESTRICT PETITONERS'S FUTURE 
VISITATION. JUDGE FISHLER DENIED RESPONDENT REQUESTS AND 
ALLOWED THE PETITIONER TO FILE A PETITION TO REDUCE CHILD 
SUPPORT PAYMENT AND STAYED ANY CONTEMPT PROCEEDING AGAINST 
PETITIONER UNTIL A REVIEW OF THE ABILITY OF THE PETITIONER 
TO PAY SUPPORT IS ACCESSED. THE PETITIONER WAS PAYING THE 
RESPONDENT BETWEEN $200.00 AND $400.00 PER MONTH WHEN THE 
RESPONDENT FILED HER O.S.C. (DCI# 81"82). 
JUDGE FISHLER WAS SO OFFENDED BY THE RESPONDENT AND HER 
ATTORNEY THAT HE RECUSED HIMSELF AND ASSIGNED THIS CASE TO 
JUDGE SAWAYA (DCI# 84). 
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ON APRIL 14, 1986, PETITIONER FILED HIS 
COUNTER-PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE (DCI# 
87-88). 
ON APRIL 22, 1986, JUDGE SAWAYA SIGNED THE ORDER OF 
JUDGE FISHLER IN WHICH #2 OF THE JUDGEMENT STATES "THE 
ISSUED OF CONTEMPT AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR HIS FAILURE TO PAY 
JUDGEMENTS AND OBLIGATION IS RESERVED UNTIL THE HEARING ON A 
PETITION BY PLAINTIFF FOR MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE WHICH WILL ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S 
ABILITY TO PAY SAID JUDGEMENTS." (DCI# 95~9) 
ON OCTOBER 14, 1986 THE PETITIONER ATTEMPTED TO PROCEED 
WITH HIS PETITION TO MODIFY BY FILING A REQUEST FOR TRIAL 
SETTING. (DCI# 101). 
COMMISSIONER SANDRA PEULAR SET A PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT 
FOR FEBRUARY 13, 1987. (DCI# 104) 
RESPONDENT RESISTED ANY SETTLEMENT AND FILED OBJECTION 
TO REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING. (DCI# 105). 
ON MARCH 17, 1988 PETITIONER WAS BEING DENIED HIS 
VISITATION AND FILED A ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO FORCE 
RESPONDENT TO ALLOW HIS VISITATION WITH HIS DAUGHTER. (DCI# 
111-2). 
RESPONDENT CLAIMED IT WAS UNFAIR THAT SHE COULD BE 
CALLED TO COURT TO ANSWER FOR DENYING VISITATION WHEN 
PETITIONER WAS DELINQUENT IN HIS CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
(DCI# 125). 
ON 18, APRIL, 1988 COMMISSIONER PEULER FOUND NO 
CONTEMPT OF THE PETITIONER AT THIS TIME AND RESPONDENT 
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PROMISED TO ALLOW PETITIONER HIS VISITATION FROM NOW ON. 
(DCI# 129). 
ON MAY 6, 1988* RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND REQUESTED THAT THE PLAINTIFF PAY.THE FULL AMOUNT OF HER 
ATTORNEY FEESI BEGIN MAKING CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS WITH A 
WEEKLY. . REDUCTION OF .THE .JUDGEMENT>.AND THAT PLAI NT IFF BE 
ADVISED.THAT IF_HE DOES NOT COMPLY HE WILL BE ARRESTED- AND-
JAILED UNTIL HE IS WILLING TO COMPLY. (DCI# 135). RESPONDENT-
FILED AT THE SAME TIME A PETITION TO DENY PETITIONER 
ALTERNATE FRIDAY VISITS. (DC I# 140) 
AFTER SEVERAL DELAYS AND CONTINUANCES RESPONDENT'S 
O.S.C. CAME BEFORE JUDGE SAWAYA ON OCTOBER 3> 1988. 
PETITIONER AND HIS ATTORNEY WERE WILLING TO STIPULATE TO THE 
CONDITIONS OF THE O.S.C HOWEVER JUDGE SAWAYA MADE HIS OWN 
MOTION AND ORDERED IT BE HEARD AT THE END OF HIS LAW AND 
MOTION CALENDER THAT DAY. JUDGE SAWAYA THEN FOUND THE 
PETITIONER GUILTY OF CONTEMPT. SENTENCED HIM TO SERVED 30 
DAY.IN THE COUNTY JAIL> STAYED IMPOSITION OF JAIL SENTENCE 
FOR. 60 DAYS TO ALLOW..THE PETITONER TO PURGE THE CONTEMPT BY 
PAYING THE RESPONDENT A.SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT, OF MONEY.- (DC I # 
170) 
DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER OF 1989 THE PETITIONER 
SERVED HIS JAIL SENTENCE. 
ON FEBRUARY 24* 1990 RESPONDENT FILED A ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSEI IN THIS O.S.C. RESPONDENT REQUESTED THE SUSPEND 
VISITATION OF PETITIONER UNTIL HE IS NOT IN CONTEMPT OF 
COURT AND PAYING HER SUPPORT. (DCI# 214) 
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ON APRIL 13; 1990 THE COURT CANCELED THE HEARING ON 
RESPONDENT'S O.S.C. AND RESPONDENT FILED A NOTICE OF 
CONTINUANCE. (DCI# 258) 
ON APRIL 24; 1990; THE PETITIONER APPEARED AT THE 
O.S.C. HEARING AND WAS TOLD BY .THE COURT CLERK, THAT THE 
HEARING HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND THAT THE RESPONDENT WOULD 
HAVE TO SERVED THE PETITIONER WITH A NEW O.S.C. BEFORE SHE 
COULD HAVE HER O.S.C. HEARD BY THE JUDGE. 
ON MAY 21; 1990 THE RESPONDENT; THOUGH HER ATTORNEY; 
ASKED JUDGE SAWAYA TO ISSUE A BENCH WARRANT FOR THE ARREST 
OF THE PETITIONER BECAUSE HE HAD NOT SHOWN FOR THE O.S.C. 
THE PETITIONER HAD NOT BEEN SERVED WITH A NEW O.S.C. AND 
THEREFORE FELT HE DID NOT HAVE TO ATTEND; HOWEVER; 
PETITIONER KNEW OF JUDGE SAWAYA BIAS AGAINST HIM AND SENT 
RAY STODDARD, A ATTORNEY THAT HAD REPRESENTED HIM EARLY IN 
THIS CASE; TO INFORM JUDGE SAWAYA THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT 
BEEN SERVED WITH THE O.S.C.AND THAT THE PETITIONER AND HIS 
ATTORNEY COULD. BE IN JUDGE SAWAYA COURT ROOM WITHIN 15 
MINUTES IF JUDGE SAWAYA WANTED TO HOLD THE HEARING. JUDGE 
SAWAYA STATED THAT HE KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON AND THEN ISSUED 
A NO BAIL BENCH WARRANT AGAINST PETITIONER. (DCI# 254) 
WHEN MR. STODDARD TOLD THE PETITIONER OF JUDGE SAWAYA 
ACTIONS HE DIRECTED HIS ATTORNEY TO CONTACT JUDGE SAWAYA AND 
HAVE THE WARRANT RECALLED. ONLY AFTER JUDGE SAWAYA WAS SHOWN 
THE DOCKET PRINTOUT SHOWING THE CANCELLING OF THE O.S.C. 
HEARING DID JUDGE SAWAYA' RECALL THE WARRANT; HOWEVER HE 
RULED THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT HAD TO SERVE THE PETITIONER 
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WITH A O.S.C. AND SET THE HEARING FOR JUNE 18; 1990. (DCI# 
256-9) 
ON JUNE 18; 1990 JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND THE PETITIONER 
GUILTY OF CONTEMPT; DENIED ALL CONTACT BETWEEN PETITIONER 
AND HIS DAUGHTER; SENTENCED THE PETITIONER TO SERVE 30 DAY 
IN THE COUNTY JAIL AND STAYED THE IMPOSITION OF THE JAIL 
SENTENCE FOR 30 DAY TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PAY THE 
RESPONDENT SOME MONEY. (DCI# 262) 
ON JULY 13; 1990 JUDGE SAWAYA SIGNED A ORDER OVER THE 
TIMELY FILED OBJECTIONS OF THE PETITIONER; THOSE OBJECTIONS 
WERE NOT FRIVOLOUS NOR WERE FILED FILED AS A DELAYING 
TACTIC. (DCI# 268-71) 
ON JULY 16; 1990; PETITIONER FILED A AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS 
DIRECTED TOWARD THE BIAS CONDUCT OF JUDGE SAWAYA. AT THE 
HEARIN LATER THAT SAME DAY PETITIONER TOLD JUDGE SAWAYA THAT 
HE HAD FILED A AFFIDAVIT OF BAIS EARLIER AND ACCORDING THE 
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES HE COULD NO LONGER PROCEED 
UNTIL THE AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS WERE REVIEW BY THE PRESIDING 
JUDGE. JUDGE SAWAYA ACCEPT A COPY TO THE AFFIDAVIT BUT 
STATED HE WAS NOT BIAS AND THEN WHEN ON TO HOLD THE REVIEW 
HEARING. (DCI# 298) 
ON AUGUST 7, 1990; JUDGE MURPHY DENIED PETITIONER 
AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS. (DCI# 298) 
ON AUGUST 13; 1990 PETITIONER FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FOR BOTH THE JULY 13 ORDER OF JUDGE SAWAYA AND THE AUGUST 7 
ORDER DENYING THE AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS BY JUDGE MURPHY. (DCI# 
316) 
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ON OCTOBER 10* 1990* THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED JUDGE 
SAWAYA ORDER AS IT RELATES TO VISITATION. 
ON JANUARY 9 1991 JUDGE SAWAYA SIGNED A AMENDED ORDER 
AGAIN DENYING PETITIONER VISITATION RIGHTS. 
PETITIONER THEN ASKED THE COURT OF APPEALS TO REVIEW 
THE JANUARY 9TH ORDER AND STAY THE EFFECT OF SAID UNTIL THE 
CASE COULD BE GIVING A FAIR HEARING. 
ON FEBRUARY 4, 1991* THE COURT OF APPEALS DENIED THE 
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR STAY. 
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ARGUMENTS 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING AN ORDER THAT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THERE IS A CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT OF A PARENT TO MAINTAIN A PERSONAL AND CLOSE 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR CHILDREN. 
A PARENT HAS A "FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT. PROTECTED BY THE 
CONSTITUTION/ TO SUSTAIN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS CHILD." 
STATE IN RE WALTER B., UTAH, 577 P.2ND 119. 124 (1978). 
IN MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.CT. 625, 
626, 67 L.ED. 1042 (1923), THE SUPREME COURT INCLUDED FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE "LIBERTY" OF WHICH A STATE CANNOT 
DEPRIVE ANY PERSON WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
THE RIGHTS INHERENT IN FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS-HUSBAND-WIFE, PARENT-CHILD AND SIBLING-ARE THE 
MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLES OF RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE. THEY 
ARE "NATURAL," "INTRINSIC," OR "PRIOR" IN THE SENSE THAT OUR 
CONSTITUTIONS PRESUPPOSE THEM, ...IN RE J.P., UTAH 648 P.2D 
1373. THIS PARENTAL RIGHT TRANSCENDS ALL PROPERTY AND 
ECONOMIC RIGHTS. IT IS ROOTED NOT IN STATE OR FEDERAL 
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, TO WHICH IT IS LOGICALLY 
AND CHRONOLOGICALLY PRIOR, BUT IN NATURE AND HUMAN 
in 
INSTINCT. SUPRA.9 1375. "...TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST AND WITHOUT 
ANY FINDING OF PARENTAL UNFITNESS; ABANDONMENT* OR 
SUBSTANTIAL NEGLECT* VIOLATES THE PARENT'S LIBERTY RIGHTS 
UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION." SUPRA a 1375 
THE ORDER OF JANUARY 9TH DID NOT FIND* AS REQUIRED 
ABOVE* ANY FINDING OF UNFITNESS* ABANDONMENT OR SUBSTANTIAL 
NEGLECT AND THEREFORE MUST BE FOUND IN CONTRADICTION WITH 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BE OVERTURNED. 
THE APPELLANT NEXT CONTENDS THAT THE ORDER VIOLATES THE 
EIGHT AMENDMENT* OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN THAT 
IT CALL FOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. IT IS UNUSUAL 
BECAUSE NO OTHER COURT HAS EVER DENIED ALL CONTACT BETWEEN 
PARENT AND CHILD FOR THE REASON STATED IN THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF THIS ORDER. IT IS CRUEL 
BECAUSE IT DESTROYS A LOVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENT AND 
CHILD AND IT ALLOWS THE CUSTODIAL PARENT TO TELL THE CHILD 
THAT HER FATHER DOES NOT LOVE HER ANYMORE BECAUSE IT DOES 
NOT WANT TO SEE HER ANYMORE* A FACT ALLEGED IN PETITIONER 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT FOR STAY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
AND LEFT UNCHALLENGED BY RESPONDENT AT THE HEARING OR ANY 
OTHER PLACE. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE ORDER VIOLATES THE 
FOURTEEN AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, IN 
THAT HE HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS. UTAH LAW REQUIRES *A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE FOUND BEFORE A 
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CUSTODY DECREE IS MODIFIED." SMITH V. SMITH, 793 P.2D 409. 
ALSO IN HODGGE V. HODGEE, 649 P.2D 51 (UTAH 1982), HODGEE 
HELD THAT A PARENT SEEKING A CHANGE IN CUSTODY OF A CHILD 
MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL AND 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE ORIGINAL 
CUSTODY AWARD WAS BASED. 
IN ALL CASE, EXCEPT FOR THIS ONE, THE COURT HAS 
REQUIRED A PETITION TO MODIFY BEFORE CHANGING CUSTODIAL 
ARRANGEMENT, 'RESPONDENT HAS TRIED AND FAILED IN SEVERAL 
ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE VISITATION OF APPELLANT, THOUGH THE 
REGULAR PETITIONS TO MODIFY, NOW WITH ORDER TO SHOW TO 
CAUSE AS PUNISHMENT TO THE APPELLANT JUDGE SAWAYA HAS DENIED 
VISITATION RIGHTS AND IN EFFECT MODIFIED THE DIVORCE DECREE, 
DENYING THE APPELLANT HIS DUE PROCESS OF CHALLENGING THE 
ASSERTIONS AND PRESENTING HIS DEFENSES. 
JUDGE SAWAYA STATED IF HE FOUND THE NONPAYMENT OF CHILD 
WAS WILLFUL HE COULD TERMINATE VISITATION, (TRANSCRIPT OF 
JUNE 18, 1990, PAGES 37 LINES 23-25, PAGE 38 LINES 1-4). 
JUDGE TOOK NO EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE 
CHILD HOWEVER, IN THE JANUARY 9TH ORDER JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND 
IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD NOT TO HAVE ANY 
CONTACT WITH HER FARTHER, "BECAUSE THE FAILURE TO PAY CHILD 
SUPPORT HAS BEEN WILLFUL, THE COURT FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF 
DOES NOT, IN PART, RESPECT THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE LAW 
REQUIRING PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. FOR THAT REASON, THE 
COURT FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF'S ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ARE 
ANTI-SOCIAL AND CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATION FROM THE 
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MORAL NORMS OF SOCIETY". (FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW RE: JANUARY 9. 1991 ORDER). THUS JUDGE SAWAYA BY NOT 
REQUIRING THE RESPONDENT TO FOLLOW THE STATUTORIAL PROCEDURE 
AND PRESENT HER EVIDENCE AND ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO COUNTER 
WITH HIS DEFENSES AND EVIDENCE DENIED APPELLANT HIS DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE ORDER OF JANUARY 
VIOLATES THE FLRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. "BECAUSE THE FAILURE TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT HAS 
BEEN WILLFUL; THE COURT FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF DOES NOT# IN 
PARTI RESPECT THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE LAW REQUIRING PAYMENT 
OF CHILD SUPPORT. FOR THAT REASON* THE COURT FINDS THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ARE ANTI-SOCIAL AND 
CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATION FROM THE MORAL NORMS OF 
SOCIETY. A PARENT INFLUENCES A CHILD FOR GOOD OR BAD; SOME 
OF THAT INFLUENCE COMES FROM THE CHILD'S OBSERVATIONS OF THE 
PARENT'S BEHAVIOR. FOR THESE REASONS; THE COURT FINDS THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S BEHAVIORS AND ATTITUDES* WITH RESPECT TO NOT 
PAYING CHILD SUPPORT. ARE NOT A PROPER EXAMPLE FOR HIS CHILD 
AND THAT UNTIL PLAINTIFF ADOPTS AN ATTITUDE. MANIFEST BY 
APPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR. THAT HE RESPECT THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND 
INTENDS TO CONFORM WITH THE LAWS OF THIS STATE AND THE 
DIRECTIVES OF THE COURT. HE SHOULD NOT HAVE PERSONAL CONTACT 
WITH HIS DAUGHTER.". (FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW RE: JANUARY 9. 1991 ORDER). 
IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS PORTION OF THE FINDING OF FACT 
THAT JUDGE SAWAYA IS PUNISHING THE APPELLANT FOR HIS 
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DISRESPECT AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT. COURTS AND 
LEGAL SYSTEM. HOW AN ORDER CAN MORE CLEARLY VIOLATE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROTEST AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IS 
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE. ALTHOUGH APPELLANT CONTENDS HE DOES 
NOT HAVE SUCH ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS. IF HE DID* IT IS HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE SUCH AND TO DEMONSTRATE THOSE 
BELIEF AND ATTITUDES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND TEACH HIS 
CHILDREN THOSE SAME ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS. To PUNISH FOR 
SUCH ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ARE UNACCEPTABLE IN THIS 
COUNTRY.' THEREFORE; ANY ORDER THAT PUNISHES FOR SUCH REASON 
MUST BE OVERTURNED. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT REASONING USED BY JUDGE 
SAWAYA IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT HE COMMIT THE LOGICAL FALLACY OF 
HASTY GENERALIZATION. "TO INFER THAT ALL A IS B FROM ONE 
INSTANCES OF A BEING B IS FALLACIOUS UNLESS THE A IS KNOWN 
TO REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL A's". FUNDAMENTALS OF LOGIC. JAMES 
D. CARNEY AND RICHARD K. SCHEER. PAGE HI, JUDGE SAWAYA 
ARGUMENT IS PLAINTIFF DOES NOT PAY CHILD SUPPORT. THEREFORE 
HE DOES NOT INPART RESPECT THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE LAW 
REQUIRING PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. THEREFORE HIS ATTITUDES 
AND BEHAVIORS ARE ANTISOCIAL. THEREFORE HIS SHOULD NOT HAVE 
ANY CONTACT WITH HIS CHILD. THE ARE SEVERAL REASON FOR NOT 
PAYING CHILD SUPPORT THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH RESPECT 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT. NOT HAVING RESPECT FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
DOES NOT MAKE ONE ANTI-SOCIAL. No WHERE DOES JUDGE SAWAYA 
CONTENDS THAT THE CHILD HAS ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HER FATHER 
NONPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT NOR THAT SUCH KNOWLEDGE IS 
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EFFECTING HER. SIMPLY PUT JUDGE SAWAYA LOGIC DOES NOT 
SUPPORT HIS ORDER AND THEREFORE FOR THAT REASON ALONE IT 
SHOULD BE OVERTURNED. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING VISITATION FOR THE 
SOLE REASON OF NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT ALTHOUGH THE JANUARY 9, 
1991 ORDER APPEARS TO HAVE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD AS 
THE CAUSE FOR TERMINATING VISITATION; THE LOGIC OF JUDGE 
SAWAYA IS CLEARLY FOUNDED ONLY ON THE NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD 
SUPPORT. THE PRIMARY PREMISES IS "BECAUSE THE NON-PAYMENT OF 
CHILD SUPPORT HAS BEEN WILLFULL..." JUDGE SAWAYA THEN GOES 
ON TO DEDUCES THAT IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 
NOT TO SEE HER FATHER AGAIN. 
JUDGE SAWAYA STATED AT THE JUNE 18 HEARING "YOU MAKE NO 
REAL EFFORT* AS I SEE IT# TO PAY ANY MONEY TO THIS WOMAN TO 
HELP SUPPORT YOUR OWN CHILD. SO I FIND YOU IN CONTEMPT OF 
COURT. I AM GOING TO TAKE AWAY YOUR VISITATION PRIVILEGES 
FOR THAT." PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING DATED 18> 1990. 
IN LUNSFORD V. WALDRIP, 493 P.2D 789* THE WASHINGTON 
COURT OF APPEALS* IN A CASE VERY SIMILAR TO THE CASE AT BAR* 
STATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT FINDINGS WERE NO MORE THAN A 
ATTEMPT TO DISGUISE THE NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT 
PAYMENT. "WE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE CAN BE GOOD AND SOUND 
REASON TO REGULATE OR DENY VISITATION PRIVILEGES* BUT THE 
ORDER WHICH IS UNDER REVIEW HERE DOES NOT CITE ANY REASON 
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OTHER THAT THE FAILURE TO PAY MONEY THAT IS DUE. WITHHOLDING 
VISITATION FOR THE SOLE REASON THAT MONEY IS UNPAID AND 
OWING IS AN IMPROPER EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION." 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN SLADE V. DENIS, 594 P.2D 898 
STATED "THE GENERAL POLICY OF THE LAW .IS THAT A PARENT WILL 
BE DENIED VISITATION RIGHTS ONLY UNDER EXTRAORDINARY 
CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS COURT IS RELUCTANT TO DENY ALL 
VISITATION RIGHTS, UNLESS THE CHILD'S WELFARE IS JEOPARDIZED 
THEREBY." 
THE OREGON COURT OF APPEALS IN WEST V. WEST, 487 P.2D 
96, STATED "THE RULE THAT VISITATION MAY NOT BE CONDITIONED 
UPON PAYMENT OF SUPPORT OR SUPPORT MAY NOT BE CONDITION UPON 
COOPERATION IN ALLOWING VISITS IS INVOKED TO PREVENT TRIAL 
COURT FROM PUNISHING THE RECALCITRANT PARENT THROUGH THE 
CHILDREN RIGHT OF VISITATION CANNOT BE MADE DEFENDANT 
UPON PAYMENT OF SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN, IN PART BECAUSE THE 
WELFARE OF THE CHILDREN UNDERLIE THE ALLOWANCE OF VISITATION 
WITH CHILDREN BY THE PARENT NOT HAVING CUSTODY." 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT IN SODERBURG V. SQLDERBURG, 299 
P.2D 479, STATED "IT IS ONLY UNDER EXTRAORDINARY 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT A PARENT SHOULD BE DENIED THE RIGHT OF 
VISITATION OF A CHILD." 
THIS COURT IN SMITH V. SMITH, 135 UTAH ADV. REP. 33 
STATED "MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY DECREE MUST SERVE THE BEST 
INTEREST OF THE CHILD" YOU WENT ON TO SAY THE BEST INTEREST 
OF THE CHILD ARE "PROMOTED BY HAVING THE CHILD RESPECT FOR 
AND LOVE OF BOTH PARENTS. 'FOSTERING THE CHILD RELATIONSHIP 
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WITH A NON-CUSTODIAL HAS IMPORTANT BEARING ON THE CHILD'S 
BEST INTEREST.' DANA V. DANA, 131 UTAH ADV. REP. 76, 78." 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN ROHR V. ROHR, 709 P.2D 382, 
STATED "...THE PARAMOUNT CONCERN IN CHILDREN VISITATION 
MATTERS IS THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD." 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT JUDGE SAWAYA BELIEVED AT 
THE JUNE 18 HEARING THAT HE COULD TERMINATE THE APPELLANT 
VISITATION FOR THE SOLE REASON OF NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD 
SUPPORT, AS THE TRANSCRIPT CLEARLY SHOWS. HOWEVER, WHEN HIS 
ORDER WAS VACATED BY THIS COURT AND TOLD THAT HE MUST 
CONFORM TO THE RHOR DECISION OF THE BEST INTEREST ON THE 
CHILD, JUDGE SAWAYA, WHO'S JUNE 18 HEARING DID NOT CONTAIN 
ANY TESTIMONY OF EVIDENCE OF THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST, USED 
GENERALITIES AND ATTITUDES TO SHOW THE BEST INTEREST WAS NOT 
TO HAVE VISITATION OF PARENT~CHILD. IT IS INTERESTING TO 
READ THE COMMENTS OF JUDGE SAWAYA WHEN HE AGREED WITH THE 
APPELLANT THAT "NOT BEING ABLE TO VISIT HER, NOT BEING ABLE 
TO SAY THAT, IT IS VERY DAMAGING TO HER AS WELL AS ME." WHEN 
HE SAID "I AM SURE THAT IT IS." PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF JUNE 
18, 1990 HEARING AT PAGE 3. IT IS CLEAR THAT WHEN THE BIAS 
ACTIONS OF JUDGE SAWAYA IS VIEW IN OVERVIEW OF THIS CASE 
THERE CAN BE NO OTHER CONCLUSION THAT JUDGE SAWAYA DOES NOT 
CARE ABOUT ANYTHING BUT PUNISHING THE APPELLANT, EVEN AT THE 
EXPENSE HIS CHILD. APPELLANT ATTITUDES ARE THAT HE DOES NOT 
ACCEPT JUDGE SAWAYA HANDLING OF THIS CASE, SINCE JUDGE 
SAWAYA ENTER THIS CASE THE MATTERS HAS JUST DETERIORATED TO 
THE DETRIMENT OF ALL INVOLVED, PARTLY BE CAUSE MR. HOLGREM, 
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DEFENDANT' ATTORNEY KNOWS; AS HE ADMITTED IN THE MOTION FOR 
STAY HEARING BEFORE THIS COURT; JUDGE SAWAYA WILL GIVE HIM 
ALL THE LATITUDE HE NEED TO PURSUE THE APPELLANT. THEREFORE 
IN STEAD OF NEGOTIATING A SOLUTION TO THIS CASE, HE 
MAINTAINS A POSITION THAT APPELLANT CANNOT PERFORM. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONDITIONING THE RESTORATION 
OF VISITATION RIGHTS UPON THE PAYMENT AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
SUPPORT ORDERS. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT OF UTAH IN RQHR, SUPRA; SAID 
*... CONDITIONING ANY FUTURE MODIFICATIONS OF DIVORCE UPON 
FATHER'S PRIOR COMPLIANCE WITH SUPPORT ORDER IMPERMISSIBLY 
PREDICATED FATHER'S FUTURE RIGHTS TO MODIFICATION UPON 
HAPPENING OF ONE PREDETERMINED EVENTJ MODIFICATION WOULD 
ALWAYS BE AVAILABLE CONTINGENT ONLY UPON MATERIAL CHANGE OF 
IN CIRCUMSTANCES." 
JUDGE SAWAYA CLEARLY IS DETERMINING FUTURE VISITATION 
UPON COMPLIANCE WITH THE PAYMENT OF PAST DUE CHILD SUPPORT 
AND MAINTAINING CURRENT SUPPORT PAYMENT. SENSE THE JULY 18 
REVIEW HEARING WHERE JUDGE SAWAYA ALLOW APPELLANT TO MAKE 
CHILD SUPPORT IN INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS APPELLANT HAS MAINTAIN 
HIS CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT. JUDGE SAWAYA HAS CONTINUE TO 
REVIEW APPELLANT PAYMENTS AND KNEW THAT APPELLANT WAS 
CURRENT WITH HIS PAYMENT WHEN HE CONDITIONED RESTORATION OF 
VISITATION UPON THE PAYMENT OF $450.00 FOR 4 MONTH 
CONSECUTIVE; AND THEN IF APPELLANT DOES NOT KEEP CURRENT THE 
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$150.00 THEN THE RESPONDENT CAN WITHOUT A HEARING TERMINATE 
VISITATION RIGHT. THE SUM OF $450.00 IS MORE THAN APPELLANT 
CAN PAY AND REPRESENTS MORE THAN 50% OF HIS INCOME. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN USING IT'S CONTEMPT P0VER TO 
DENY AND TERMINATE VISITATION. 
UTAH CODE 78-32-10 STATES: 
"UPON THE ANSWER AND EVIDENCE TAKEN THE COURT OR JUDGE 
MUST DETERMINE WHETHER THE PERSON PROCEEDED AGAINST IS 
GUILTY OF THE CONTEMPT CHARGE, AND IF IT IS ADJUDGED THAT HE 
IS GUILTY, OF CONTEMPT, A FINE MAY IMPOSED UPON HIM NOT 
EXCEEDING $200.00 OR HE MAY BE IMPRISONED IN THE COUNTY 
JAIL NOT EXCEEDING THIRTY DAYS, OR MAY BE BOTH FINED AND 
IMPRISONED." 
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE REALIZING THAT CONTEMPT OF COURT 
IMPLIES THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JUDGE AND PERSON 
CHARGE IS STRAINED AT BEST, LIMITS THE JUDGES POWER TO BE 
VINDICTIVE AND UNJUSTLY PUNISH THE OFFENDER. TO ALLOW JUDGE 
SAWAYA ABUSE HIS POWERS OF CONTEMPT POWERS BY TERMINATING 
VISITATION RIGHTS OF THE APPELLANT IS IN CONFLICT WITH THIS 
STATUE. A JUDGE CAN, IN SO MANY DIFFERENT WAYS, ABUSE A 
RIGHTS OF LITIGANT THAT THE LEGISLATURE MUST LIMIT HIS 
POWER TO PUNISH. 
THE WASHINGTON COURT RECOGNIZED THAT IT IS WRONG TO 
PUNISH PARENTS BY DENYING VISITATION RIGHT WHEN IT STATED IN 
HATTER Q£ MARRIAGE Q£ CABALQUINTO, 669 P.2D 886, "CHILD 
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CUSTODY AND VISITATION PRIVILEGE ARE NOT TO BE USED TO 
PENALIZE OR REWARD PARENTS FOR THEIR CONDUCT." 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING VISITATION BY NOT 
REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO FILE A PETITION TO MODIFY. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT CASE LAW AS FAR BACK AS 
1900'S HAVE UNIVERSALLY HELD, AND LATER STATE STATUES 
CONFIRMED, THAT VISITATION CANNOT BE MODIFIED OR RESTRICTED 
WITHOUT FILING A PETITION TO MODIFY. (U.C.A. 30~3-5) 
IN THE ROHR* SUPRA; THE CASE WAS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT 
WITH A PETITION TO MODIFY, EVEN IN ROHR, THE COURT DID NOT 
DENY ALL CONTACT BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD, A CASE NOT ONLY 
INVOLVING NONPAYMENT OF SUPPORT BUT ALSO VISITATION ABUSE. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT AND IN OPPOSITION WITH STATE STATUES, 
THEREFORE THIS ORDER MUST BE OVERTURNED. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING A ORDER OVER THE 
TIHELY FILED OBJECTIONS TO SAID ORDER. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION RULE 4-504 (2) GIVES THE PLAINTIFF FIVE (5) 
IN WHICH TO OBJECT TO ANY PROPOSED ORDER. 
IN THE CASE AT BAR THE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY MAILED A 
COPY OF THE PROPOSED ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO THE 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY ON THE 3RD OF JULY, 1990. ALLOWING THE 
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STATUTORY TIME FOR MAILING AND THE FIVE DAY RESPONSE TIMEI 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER WAS RECEIVED BY THE 
CLERK OF THE COURT ON JULY H I 1990 WELL WITHIN THE TIME 
LIMITS* PLAINTIFF ALSO FILED AT THE SAME TIME A NOTICE OF 
HEARING TO HEAR HIS OBJECTIONS. 
JUDGE SAWAYA APPARENTLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAS A RIGHTS TO OBJECT TO ANY OF DEFENDANT PROPOSED ORDERS 
OR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW* AS HE SIGNED THE 
JULY 13 ORDER OVER THE TIMELY FILED OBJECTIONS AND TOLD THE 
APPELLANT THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW OBJECTION TO THE JANUARY 9 
1991 ORDER AND IN FACT PUNISH THE APPELLANT BY DOUBLING THE 
AMOUNT OF CONSECUTIVE PAYMENT NEEDED TO REINSTATE HIS 
VISITATION RIGHTS WHEN THE APPELLANT OBJECT TO DEFENDANT 
PROPOSED FINDING OF FACT AND ORDER* STATING "YOU MAY NOT 
LIKE WHAT I END UP DOING." "YOU CAN FILE OBJECTIONS 
THEREAFTER* BUT IT WON'T DO YOU ANY GOOD." TRANSCRIPT OF THE 
NOVEMBER 26* 1990 HEARING PAGES 10 AND 21. 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT ALL THOUGH THESE HEARING 
AND LEGAL PROCESS JUDGE SAWAYA DEMONSTRATED HIS DISLIKE FOR 
THE APPELLANT AND URGES THIS COURT TO REVIEW THE WHOLE 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE NOVEMBER 26* 1990 HEARING TO SEE JUST HOW 




THE APPELLANT URGES THIS COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTIONS OF 
THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE AND COMPARE THEM TO THE 
LAWS AND CONSTITUTION. THE CASE IS CLEAR; CAN A JUDGE 
DESTROY A LOVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A FATHER AND HIS 
DAUGHTER SIMPLY TO PUNISH THE FATHER FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH 
THE JUDGES ORDERI WHEN THERE IS NOT A CENTILE OF EVIDENCE 
THAT THE NONCOMPLIANCE HAS ANY JEOPARDIZING EFFECT ON THE 
CHILD; AND THEN MAKE THE CONDITIONS OF REINSTATEMENT OF 
PERSONAL CONTACT WITH HIS DAUGHTER BEYOND HIS REACH. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105 
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